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Abstract
 
 
This paper examines the effect of return migration on non-migrant Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip from 1981 to 1992.   I find that higher return migration is correlated with higher wages and lower 
employment for non-migrants. These results are inconsistent with what one would expect from an increase in 
migration; however, they are remarkably robust across various definitions of skill groups. While many of the 
specified models do not yield statistically significant results, there is a pattern for which results tend to be 
significant. In general, the effect of migration is more significant for lower skilled workers than for higher 
skilled workers. Increasing the number of return migrants by five percentage points is predicted to increase 
wages by five to ten percent and decrease employment by five to ten percentage points. This implies that 
overall earnings of Palestinians are not affected by return migration.
 Where should Palestinians be allowed to live? Few issues in Palestinian-Israeli relations are as politically 
difficult as this one. For example, when the Camp David II talks collapsed in July 2000, the main issue that 
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat found unacceptable was Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s position 
concerning refugees. Since the outbreak of violence later that fall (the Al-Aqsa Intifada), Israelis of many 
political perspectives have been backing some form of “transfer” (expulsion from Palestine) as a solution to 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Blecher, 2002).  Even more recently, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
wanted Palestinian negotiators to drop any insistence on the “right of return” for Palestinian refugees before 
Israel complied with any aspect of the recently unveiled “road map” (Bennet, 2003).  While many of the 
concerns about refugees are explicitly political (and not economic) in nature, the economics of Palestinian 
return migration should inform the political solution. If Palestinians returning to the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip do not have a negative impact on the Palestinian economy, then the return of refugees is also likely to 
have little effect on the Israeli economy. This paper examines the economic effects of return migration flows 
to the West Bank and Gaza Strip from 1981 to 1992 and finds that higher return migration does not have a 
substantial negative impact on the labor market outcomes of non-migrant Palestinians.   
There has been no previous research on the economic effects Palestinian return migration, although much 
research has examined the effects of immigration on a host country’s economy. The main difference between 
return migration and immigration concerns the characteristics of those arriving in the country and those 
already there. With immigration, newly arriving immigrants are ethnically distinct from the natives of the 
host country. Also, immigrants usually do not have the same human capital: they possess inferior host-
country language skills and acquire their education and training in their home country.  With return 
migration, returnees and non-migrants are of the same ethnic background.  Returnees and non-migrants may 
have different levels of human capital, but returnees usually have additional training and skills compared to 
non-migrants. While noting the differences between the cases of return migration and immigration, this paper 
uses the methodology developed in the study of the economic effects of immigration to study the effects of 
Palestinian return migration. 
Research into the economic effects of immigration on wages and employment of natives produces mixed 
results.  Given the recent magnitude of immigration to the US, researchers expect to find a large adverse 
impact from the arrival of immigrants.  Most research, however, (see Borjas (1994) for a summary) finds a 
negative but numerically small effect from immigration.  In order to explain this finding, some economists 
contend that internal migration of natives works to mitigate the effects of immigration (see, e.g. Card (1990), 
Friedberg and Hunt (1995) and Filer (1992)).  Natives either leave high immigration areas for regions with 
less immigration or do not move to areas with large inflows of immigrants. If natives respond to the inflows 
of immigrants, then the estimated effects from cross-sectional studies could be much smaller than the actual 
effects on wages and employment in the economy as a whole. 
For the case of Palestinian migration, one can consider four waves of Palestinian emigration. The first three 
occurred after World War I, after the formation of the state of Israel in 1948, and after the June 1967  (Six 
Day) War. These migrations mostly consisted of Palestinians, from the region containing the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip and the current state of Israel, fleeing their homeland (Palestine).  These migrants largely went to 
the surrounding Arab states, Europe, or the US.  With the rise in oil production in the Gulf States in the 
1960s, an economically motivated migration began (Sayigh, 1979).  These migrants tended to stay for long 
periods of time and worked in managerial, technical, and professional occupations [1]. Beginning in the 
1980s the employment opportunities for Palestinians in the Gulf began to dry up, and many of these 
economic migrants returned to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  The trickle of return migration became a flood 
after 1990 as Palestinians working in Kuwait either fled when Iraq invaded Kuwait or were expelled by the 
Kuwaiti government when the Kuwaitis were returned to power. While most of these returnees initially chose 
to relocate in Jordan, many of them eventually found their way back to the West Bank and Gaza Strip [2].  
Using OLS and Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions, I find that return migration from 1981 to 1992 does 
not have a substantial negative impact on the labor market outcomes of non-migrant Palestinians.   While 
there appears to be a negative effect of return migration on the employment of non-migrants, there is a 
positive effect on their wages. This counter-intuitive result is confirmed using three separate definitions of 
skills groups:  predicted wage deciles, education-experience groups, and occupational groups. These effects 
are more pronounced in lesser-skilled workers, but the overall impact implies that worker earnings are not 
affected by return migration. The increase in wages completely offsets the decrease in employment for 
Palestinian non-migrants. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I presents some basic descriptive statistics concerning 
emigration from and return migration to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Section II shows the effect of return 
migration on wages and employment.  Section III concludes and reflects on the policy implications of the 
findings.
 
I.  Data and Descriptive Statistics
 
In this paper I use data from the Territories Labor Force Survey (TLFS) conducted by Israel’s Central Bureau 
of Statistics (ICBS).  The TLFS was conducted by local (Palestinian) enumerators who were employed by the 
ICBS. The ICBS based the weighting and enumeration of the survey upon an original census of the region 
conducted in 1968. Because of the antiquity of this census, the accuracy of the weights used for this survey is 
questionable.  Despite this, Angrist (1995) showed that the wage profiles found in independent surveys and 
those from the TLFS are very similar, lending support for the accuracy of this survey's sampling method [3].  
Additional problems arose while administering the survey during times of crisis.  With the beginning of the 
Intifada in 1987, data collection became more difficult, especially since enumerators were working for the 
government that people were protesting against.  Restrictions on travel during periods of curfew also made 
data collection difficult during these times.       
        Table 1 shows some of the demographic characteristics of migrant, returnee, and non-migrant 
Palestinians from the TLFS.  The first characteristic to notice is the relative proportion of these migrants.  In 
1982 (the peak year), migrants represented 10.3 % of the 15-64 year old males in the sample.  This 
proportion fell by an order of magnitude to only 1.1 % in 1991, with 1984 and 1987 being two of the years 
with the largest percentage point declines.  The reason for the slow-down of out-migration was partly due to 
the fall in oil prices during the 1980s, which slowed down the economic expansion in the Gulf and decreased 
the demand for imported labor.  Compounding this decrease in demand, Gulf countries shifted away from 
Arab workers and toward Asian (non-Arab) workers in the early 1980s [4]. Arabs were seen as potential 
troublemakers in their host countries while non-Arabs were seen as culturally less similar, less likely to stay, 
and thus less likely to stir up trouble. Although Gulf countries shifted towards non-Arab Asian workers, the 
decline in demand driven by the oil market also caused non-Arab migration to peak in the early 1980s [5].
Migrants and returnees were more educated than non-migrants, but returnees were less educated than non-
returnee migrants. The average number of years of schooling for non-migrants in 1981 was 7.4 years, 
compared to 11.8 years for migrants and 10.6 years for returnees.  While average schooling for non-migrants 
increased to 9.1 years by 1991, the increase in average schooling for migrants was slower than this, as 
migrants had an average of 13.2 years of schooling in 1994.  The average schooling of returnees was fairly 
erratic over this period.  For example, in 1987 returnees had 10.7 years of schooling, while the next year this 
average had dropped to 9.6 years.  
This pattern of education is consistent with previous research on return migration  (Dustmann, 1997; Galor 
and Stark, 1991). These authors propose that there are two reasons for migrants to return.  First, individuals 
can return home as part of a planned life cycle decision when they decide to save more abroad and then 
consume more in their home country [6].  Second, the migrant could have overestimated the employment 
opportunities and return home quickly after failing in the host country labor market.  Due to the shortage of 
skilled workers in the Gulf, failures are more likely to be from the lower end of the wage distribution; 
therefore, returnees are less skilled than all migrants.  Undoubtedly, the precipitous fall in return migration 
during the mid 1980s was in part due to the Intifada that began in December 1987.  Fewer Palestinians 
migrated during the Intifada, and even a smaller proportion returned from abroad.  Because those who 
returned during the Intifada were less educated than earlier returnees, if a worker could afford to stay abroad, 
he probably did.  Migrants were generally younger, less likely to be married and disproportionately from the 
West Bank when compared to non-migrants. Returnees were older, more likely to be married, and 
disproportionately from the Gaza Strip.     
 
II. Empirical Model and Estimation
 
To derive an empirical model, I use a basic labor demand, labor supply theoretical framework.  As return 
migration (Retmig) increases the supply of Palestinian labor, there should be two effects on the labor market 
outcomes of non-migrants: employment and wages should fall. Although overall employment expands with 
an increase in labor supply, the decrease in equilibrium wages from an increase in labor supply decreases the 
willingness of non-migrants to work.  Faced with lower wage offers, non-migrants choose alternatives to paid 
labor including household production, education and retirement. The basic model used to estimate these 
effects is the following 
Thus, the labor market outcome yijdt (employment, wages) for individual i at time t who lives in district j, 
and is part of skill group d is a function of the level of return migration at time t  in subdistrict j for skill 
group d and a set of individual characteristics in that period .  The coefficient α represents the intercept, 
and ε is the error term. It is important to note that the return migration is suggested to only affect like-skilled 
workers. Thus, a physician's return to the West Bank is proposed to have an effect on the labor market 
outcomes of another physician, but not affect a farm worker.    
The predicted sign on β is negative, as higher return migration is predicted to push down wages for all 
similar workers. As the offered wage drops below the reservation wage for marginal workers, they will no 
longer be in the labor force and employed.  Additionally, if wages are slow to adjust downward, more 
qualified returnees could be hired in the place of non-returnees and unemployment will increase.   
A main econometric issue in studies of the effect of migration on wages is the possible endogeneity of 
migration flows. Endogeneity would arise if a lower wage in one area leads to less return migration to that 
area, or if lower wages throughout the region lead to workers delaying their return until wages are higher.  
While most migration studies are concerned with more migrants being drawn toward high wage areas, that 
issue is less of a concern here.  During the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinians 
were severely restricted in their ability to build new homes and buy and sell property.  Therefore, a 
Palestinian from Jenin would not consider moving to Bethlehem when he returned from the Gulf. Temporal 
endogeneity, however, could still be a problem. If returnees wait to return until wages are high (or simply 
avoid returning when macroeconomic conditions are bad), migration might appear to cause higher wages, 
while, in fact, wages are causing more return migration. Because of this possibility, I test for endogeneity of 
return migration in both the wage and employment equations and find support of return migration being 
endogeneous (Wooldridge, 2003, p. 483).  For that reason, I will present both OLS estimates and IV 
estimates in the tables below.     
Education-Experience Groups
Table 2 reports estimates from several models measuring the effects of migration on wages and employment. 
This table reports estimates where skill groups are defined by education and experience. I derive ten skill 
groups based on five education categories: less than 9 years of schooling, 9 to 11 years, 12 years, 13 to 15 
years, and 16 or more years. I then split each of these five education groups into two: one with less than 15 
years of experience and one with 15 or more years. Each of the cells in table 2 represents  from equation 1, 
the estimated effect of skill group, region and time specific return migration on a labor market outcome. The 
top panel presents estimates using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and the bottom panel presents 
estimates using instrumental variable (IV) regression. The dependent variable is either the natural log of the 
individual’s wage (rows 1, 2, 5 and 6) or a dummy variable for employment status (rows 3, 4, 7 and 8), 
where the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual is employed and zero otherwise. In the first 
column I use the sample including all skill groups, while the next four columns keeps certain skill groups and 
excludes all others. The rows represent models with different dependent variables (wages and employment) 
with and without district fixed effects. The set of independent variables used in both models includes average 
age, age squared, years of schooling, nine district dummies, year and quarter dummies, a marriage dummy, 
and dummies for sector of work. The wage equation also uses days worked per month as a regressor, and in 
the model with the full sample (the first column), I include dummies for skill groups.
The IV estimation uses the proportion of skill-group-district residents that were migrants four quarters prior 
to enumeration as the instrument for average return migration. For the IV estimates, I conducted standard 
overidentification tests for various sets of instruments including oil prices and different lags of 
outmigration. The specifications with the greatest problems appeared to be those with oil prices as 
instruments, so the specification in table 2 only includes outmigration lagged by four quarters. Another 
problem is that grouped data can naturally lead to a bias in these overidentification tests (see Hoxby and 
Passerman, 1998). When using grouped data, overidentification tests reject overidentifying restrictions too 
often. Thus, by rejecting those that do not pass the overidentification tests with grouped data, this paper is 
being conservative with its choice of instruments.  Additionally, Hausman tests on the appropriateness of IV 
over OLS for these models supported the use of IV.
The basic finding from table 2 is that return migration has a positive effect on wages and a negative effect on 
employment, but many of the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant.  In the OLS estimates, 
the effect of return migration on wages is positive and significant for the entire sample (column one, rows 
one and two) and for those with less than fifteen years of experience (columns two and three, rows one and 
two). For those with more experience, the effect is not significant.  The IV estimates largely confirm the OLS 
findings: return migration is estimated to have a positive effect on wages, with the effect concentrated in 
those with less than fifteen years of experience.
The OLS employment regressions in rows three and four imply a negative and significant effect of return 
migration on employment when using the full sample (column 1), but the effect is not statistically significant 
in six of the eight OLS models in columns 2-5.  In the IV regressions the negative effect on employment is 
statistically significant in most of the models without district fixed effects, with the exception being the most 
educated and experienced group (column 5). When district effects are included (row 8), the estimated 
coefficient is significant only with the full sample (column 1).
The economic importance of the effect of return migration is fairly large. For example, most of the estimates 
of  in the OLS log wage equation reported in table 2 are in the range of 1 to 2. These estimates imply that 
an increase in return migration from five percent of a region’s population to ten percent of its population 
would increase wages by five percent (lower bound) to ten percent (upper bound).  The IV estimates imply a 
larger effect, where the same increase in return migration (five percentage points) would increase wages by 
as much as twenty-five percent. The effect of return migration on employment is also relatively large. The 
same five percentage point increase in return migration would lead to a decrease in the probability of being 
employed five to ten percentage points.  Thus, the overall effect of the increase in wages and decrease in 
employment, cancel each other out and have no overall effect on the total earnings of non-migrants 
Palestinians.
The positive effect on wages is hard to reconcile with the theoretical effect of immigration.   While it is 
possible that the return migration variable is proxying for something that increases labor demand (or 
migration increases labor demand through general equilibrium effects), this would be inconsistent with the 
negative impact on employment. One potential explanation is that average return migration is correlated with 
higher oil prices as shown in Figure 1 given in the appendix. High oil prices are correlated with more jobs 
available in the Gulf, higher remittances from expatriate Palestinians, and more financial support for 
Palestinian institutions by Gulf States.  Due the generally buoyant economy during times with high oil prices, 
many Palestinians may not need to seek employment.  In essence, when times are good in the West Bank 
Gaza Strip (WBGS), there may be a reverse form of the added worker effect occurring: secondary earners 
drop out of the labor force when times are good.
One possible issue affecting these results is the definition of skill groups.  Imprecisely defined skill-groups 
could result in biased estimates. Because of this possibility, I check the sensitivity of my results by presenting 
results based upon alternative measures of skills: predicted wage deciles and occupation groups.   
Predicted Wage Skill Groups
 
In this section I use predicted wage deciles to define skill groups.  This definition has the advantage of being 
able to allow for sorting that may take place based upon differences in unobserved skill.  If individuals who 
have more unobserved skill are sorted into high paying sectors or occupations, then predicted wage deciles 
would group them together, while education and experience groups may not.
In order to take into account the potential difference in employment opportunities between returnees and non-
migrants, I first separate these two groups and estimate log wage equations.  In these log wage regressions 
there is a full set of age and education dummies (and age and education dummies interacted with each other) 
in addition to industry and demographic dummies [7].  All years and districts were pooled in this regression, 
so it can be seen as a single labor market for the entire occupied territory, where district wages are only 
different in their levels.  After running these regressions, predicted wages are determined separately for 
returnees and non-migrants. Individuals are then sorted by predicted wages into deciles within each year-
quarter sample in order to define the skill groups.   
Table 3 presents estimates of the model where skill groups are now defined by predicted wage decile. Again, 
return migration is hypothesized to only affect those workers who are in the same wage decile, in a given 
subdistrict and quarter. The values of the cells in table 3 are estimations of β from equation 1. This table also 
lists OLS and IV estimates with IV being the preferred specification. A series of tests concerning the 
appropriateness of IV and the instruments were also run for this specification, with the same basic findings as 
the education-experience groups reported above. 
 The first column of Table 3 includes the entire sample, and columns 2-5 include only certain skill deciles. 
These columns present results for deciles one and two (column 2), three through five (column 3), six and 
seven (column 4), and eight through ten (column 5), with lower predicted wages being in the lower deciles. 
The OLS estimates presented in Table 3 are similar to the results presented in table 2: return migration 
positively affects wages and negatively affects employment. The positive effect on wages appears to be 
concentrated in the lower skill deciles, but it is worth noting that this effect also shows up in the top three 
predicted wage deciles. In addition, these findings are not sensitive to the inclusion of district fixed effects. 
The negative employment effects of return migration are more dependent upon the model specification and 
the specific skill groups in the estimation. For example, in the full sample (column 1) and with deciles six 
and seven (column 4), the effect of migration on employment is negative and significant in the model with 
district fixed effects, but not in the model without these district effects. In the IV estimates there appears to 
be no effect on employment or wages as only three of the twenty models estimated report statistically 
significant results.
Occupational Groups
Table 4 presents estimated effects of return migration on the labor market, where these estimates group the 
data by occupations.  Thus, each worker’s wage and employment is a function of the proportion of return 
migrants in his region that have the same occupation. The first column of Table 4 presents regressions that 
include all occupations, while the next four columns present estimates of specific occupational groups: clerks 
and salesmen (column 2), farm workers (column 3), skilled laborers in construction and manufacturing 
(column 4), and unskilled laborers in construction and manufacturing (column 5).   I do not present results 
for managers, teachers and engineers (the most skilled occupational group) because these estimated effects 
were consistently insignificant. As was the case in Tables 2 and 3, the basic results from this table imply that 
return migration has a positive effect on wages but a negative effect on employment.  The findings are not as 
consistent as those from table 2 and 3.  Of the ten OLS models estimated for the wage equation, only four 
had even marginal significance. For farm workers (column 3) and unskilled laborers (column 4), return 
migration tends to increase wages, but this is not necessarily true for any other occupation. The IV estimates 
in the wage equation are extremely unstable, which can be seen by the large standard errors reported. 
Therefore, there is very little confidence in the appropriateness of IV in these particular equations.  
  The negative effect of migration on employment is considerably more consistent than the positive effect on 
wages. In the OLS estimates, the models both with and without district fixed effects show that the effect of 
migration in the full samples (column 1) was negative and significant. When separating the sample into 
specific occupations (columns 2-5) the effects are less consistent. For both clerks (column 2) and farm 
workers (column 3) the effect on employment is negative and significant, but only when not including district 
fixed effects. For unskilled laborers, the negative effect less sensitive to model specification.  
In the employment models using IV, there appears to be some estimation problems, as the standard errors get 
much larger in these equations. The negative effect of migration on employment shows up in these estimates 
for both the full sample model with and without district fixed effects, but the standard errors are ten times 
what they were in the OLS specification. Likewise, in only two of the eight sub-samples is the effect on 
employment statistically significant. Opposite of the OLS result, the IV employment estimates for farm 
workers with district fixed effects show a positive effect of return migration on employment, while this effect 
was negative for the full sample [8].
 
III.  Conclusion
This research examines the effect of Palestinian return migration on the labor markets of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip from 1981 to 1992.  While one would expect that an increase in the supply of labor, in the form of 
return migration, would have negative effects of non-migrants, we find little support for this. While return 
migration appears to decrease employment of non-migrants, as we would expect, it also tends to increase 
wages for non-migrants. This finding is not sensitive to using different definitions of skill groups.  Using 
OLS I find that for most groups’ higher return migration is correlated with higher wages and lower 
employment. In order to correct for the observed endogeneity of return migration, I also use IV estimation 
and get results consistent with the OLS models. One pattern that appears in all three skill group definitions is 
that the effect of return migration is more pronounced for less skilled workers. Specifically, return migration 
is more likely to affect unskilled laborers, workers in the first five deciles of the wage distribution, and 
workers with less than 15 years of experience. 
Thus, there appears to be only some labor market impact from Palestinian return migration, and this impact is 
not unambiguously negative. While employment for some workers tends to decrease, there is also an increase 
in the wages of some workers. Increasing the number of return migrants by five percentage points is 
predicted to increase wages by five to ten percent and decrease employment by five to ten percentage points. 
This implies that overall earnings of Palestinians are not affected by return migration. 
These results are incongruous with what should be the effects of an increase in the supply of labor. There are 
a two possible explanations for these findings. First, return migration could boost local demand if returnees 
come back as part of a lifetime decision where they work abroad and retire back in the homeland. If this is 
the case, then higher return migration could increase the demand for local workers and push up wages.  With 
the rise in income secondary workers are no longer needed, and this could lead to lower employment of non-
returnees. 
A second possibility is that workers who return increase the demand for labor locally, but cause 
disemployment of Palestinians working in Israel. Many of the returnees tend to work in Israel upon arriving 
back in the region, and it is possible that they replace non-returnee workers who had been employed there. 
Returnees retained savings from abroad could still increase demand for workers in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, but the increase in demand would not fully off-set the displacement in Israel leading to lower 
employment.  Both of these scenarios will be explored in future research.
The policy implications of this paper are straightforward but should not be overstated. Since Palestinians 
returning to the West Bank and Gaza Strip did not have a negative impact on local labor market conditions, 
there should be little fear that returning refugees would negatively affect the Israeli labor market.  Because 
the Palestinian and Israeli labor markets display a high degree of segmentation, the effect on Israelis should 
be even more muted than the effect on Palestinians. Despite this, one must be careful not to overstate these 
findings. A lack of a strong finding is not the same as saying that there is no effect. The data could be too 
noisy. Likewise, one must be careful when making out of sample predictions. This is especially true when the 
predictions use values for the independent variables that are much larger than the data used in the estimates. 
While return migration never rose above two percent of the sample, there are approximately as many 
Palestinians living outside of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as there are within those areas. No one 
can be sure what a doubling of the Palestinian population would do to the Palestinian and Israeli labor 
markets. If, on the other hand, the return of Palestinians takes place slowly, and over a number of years, the 
accumulated savings and skills of returnees imply that the labor markets may very easily be able to absorb 
any workers that return.
Endnotes
 
1.      See Shaban (1993) for details about this migration.
2.      Those who first went to Jordan before returning home were primarily from the West Bank and not from 
Gaza.  While West Bankers hold a Jordanian passport, Gazans (up until the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority in 1994) only held Egyptian travel documents, which did not allow as much freedom of movement 
as Jordanian passports.  Not only did this difference make finding a job in the Gulf more difficult for Gazans 
than West Bankers, it also restricted their movements to third countries like Jordan.
3.      Angrist (1995).
4.      The reason for this shift toward non-Arab workers was primarily political (see Richards and Waterbury 
(1996), Chapter 15).  
5.      Many of the chapters in Amjad (1989) report a decline in migration to the Gulf from Asian countries 
after 1982).
6.      See Dustmann (1997) for more about the interaction between savings abroad and           consumption at 
home for return migrants.
7.      The complete list of variables used in these regressions are as follows: dummies for four educational 
categories and two experience groups (along with their interactions), dummies for working in manufacturing, 
construction, and service sectors  (agriculture is excluded), a dummy for being married, dummies for living 
in a city or  refugee camp (village is excluded), ten district dummies, a dummy for  Gaza, fourteen yearly 
dummies, and three quarterly dummies.
8.      These IV estimates use four quarters outmigration lagged as a dependent variable. Specifications of the 
IV model with a broader set of instruments (5 quarters outlag and oilprices) also show a positive effect of 
return migration on farm employment. The N×R2 overidentification tests resulted in small test statistics, not 
allowing us to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the residuals from the 
2SLS estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics: Non-Migrants, Migrants, and Returnees
 Proportion of Population Years of Schooling Age 
Year Non-
Migrant
Migrant Returnee Non-
Migrant
Migrant Returnee Non-
Migrant
Migrant Returnee
1981 89.9%c 9.4% 0.7%  7.39 11.83 10.55  30.7 26.2 26.8
1982  87.7% 10.3% 1.9%  7.50 11.99 9.52  30.6 26.6 28.9
1983  89.3% 8.6% 2.1%  7.67 12.22 9.85  30.6 27.7 29.0
1984 91.5% 6.9% 1.6%  7.84 12.24 10.44  30.6 29.1 30.8
1985  92.3% 6.4% 1.3%  8.00 12.26 10.70  30.3 29.2 31.6
1986 93.2% 5.7% 1.1%  8.15 12.56 10.52  30.4 29.1 31.7
1987  95.0% 3.9% 1.1%  8.26 12.52 10.68  30.5 30.1 32.5
1988 96.9% 2.6% 0.5%  8.35 12.39 9.64  30.5 30.3 34.9
1989  97.8% 1.8% 0.4%  8.50 11.78 9.98  30.6 29.3 35.4
1990  98.7% 1.1% 0.2%  8.89 12.86 10.21  30.6 29.9 31.4
1991  98.3% 1.1% 0.5%  8.70 12.95 9.88  30.8 27.4 29.3
1992 98.3% 1.2% 0.6% 8.86 12.67 10.11 30.9 27.7 29.7
 
cMigrants are all those reported to be abroad for work, school or other reason during the survey quarter.  
Returnees are all those who had been reported to be abroad in a previous survey (since each individual is 
surveyed four times) but is not abroad in the current survey.
 TABLE  2
 
Return Migration’s Effect on Wages and Employment: Education and Experience Groups
 Full 
Sample
School<1
2
Exp<15
School ≥ 
12
Exp < 15
School<1
2
Exp ≥ 15
School ≥ 
12
Exp ≥ 15
OLS Estimation      
      
Log Wage 0.874 1.33 0.924 0.322 -0.105
No District Fixed 
Effects
(0.392) (0.586) (0.412) (0.597) (0.074)
      
Log Wage 1.23 2.68 1.04 1.36 0.118
District Fixed 
Effects
(0.389) (0.311) (0.451) (1.29) (0.069)
      
Employment -0.432 0.004 -0.191 -1.18 0.003
No District Fixed 
Effects
(0.178) (0.300) (0.118) (0.244) (0.021)
      
Employment -0.238 -0.083 -0.081 -0.133 0.038
District Fixed 
Effects
(0.102) (0.309) (0.077) (0.244) (0.069)
      
IV Estimation      
      
Log Wage 4.32 -1.71 4.93 -4.12 2.42
No District Fixed 
Effects
(1.03) (1.69) (0.307) (4.55) (3.86)
      
Log Wage 5.37 6.07 5.58 5.04 4.69
District Fixed 
Effects
(0.729) (2.54) (1.00) (5.64) (3.14)
      
Employment -1.90 -2.34 -0.735 -6.15 -1.67
No District Fixed 
Effects
(0.793) (1.05) (0.148) (0.157) (1.23)
      
Employment -1.28 -0.410 -0.284 -1.06 -2.09
District Fixed 
Effects
(0.507) (0.249) (0.247) (1.29) (1.95)
      
 
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The values in the cells are the estimated β from equation 1, the 
estimated effect of return migration on labor market outcomes. Each column represents using a different 
sample, while each row represents a different estimation equation.  The other regressors used in the model 
include years of schooling, age, age squared, quarterly dummies, yearly dummies, marriage dummy, 
dummies for sector of work (agriculture, construction, services, manufacturing), dummies for working in 
Israel and Jerusalem, dummies for living in a refugee camp and urban area, days or work per week, and  a 
dummy for living in Gaza. The instrumental variable models used out migration from the district four 
quarters prior as the instrument for current return migration.  
TABLE  3
 
Return Migration’s Effect on Wages and Employment: Skill Deciles
 Full 
Sample
Deciles
 1, 2
Deciles
 3-5
Deciles
 6,7
Deciles
8-10
OLS Estimation      
      
Log Wage 0.853 1.67 0.803 0.516 0.717
No District Fixed 
Effects
(0.314) (3.35) (0.237) (0.270) (0.160)
      
Log Wage 1.21 4.82 1.10 0.386 0.794
District Fixed 
Effects
(0.332) (0.754) (0.297) (0.344) (0.279)
      
Employment -0.348 -0.613 -0.401 -0.604 -0.390
No District Fixed 
Effects
(0.119) (0.534) (0.203) (0.185) (0.187)
      
Employment -0.079 -0.379 -0.164 -0.044 -0.179
District Fixed 
Effects
(0.057) (0.169) (0.085) (0.080) (0.089)
      
IV Estimation      
      
Log Wage 0.399 -0.696 1.13 1.67 -1.92
No District Fixed 
Effects
(1.50) (7.18) (0.939) (2.85) (2.18)
      
Log Wage 2.04 8.12 2.43 0.974 -0.903
District Fixed 
Effects
(1.13) (1.14) (1.34) (3.76) (1.23)
      
Employment -0.167 -1.10 -1.11 -2.21 -0.903
No District Fixed 
Effects
(0.473) (1.14) (0.329) (0.385) (1.23)
      
Employment 1.01 0.079 -0.376 0.458 0.640
District Fixed 
Effects
(0.344) (0.838) (0.461) (0.837) (0.493)
      
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  The values in the cells are the estimated β from equation 1, the 
estimated effect of return migration on labor market outcomes. Each column represents using a different 
sample, while each row represents a different estimation equation.  The other regressors used in the model 
include years of schooling, age, age squared, quarterly dummies, yearly dummies, marriage dummy, 
dummies for sector of work (agriculture, construction, services, manufacturing), dummies for working in 
Israel and Jerusalem, dummies for living in a refugee camp and urban area, days or work per week, and  a 
dummy for living in Gaza. The instrumental variable models used out migration from the district four 
quarters prior as the instrument for current return migration.  
TABLE  4
 
Return Migration’s Effect on Wages and Employment: Occupations
 Full 
Sample
Clerks,
Salesman
Farm
Workers
Skilled 
Laborers
Unskilled
Laborers
OLS Estimation      
      
Log Wage 0.473 0.197 1.40 0.213 1.25
No District Fixed 
Effects
 (0.447) (0.788) (0.891) (1.15) (0.690)
      
Log Wage 1.03 0.656 1.56 1.27 1.73
District Fixed 
Effects
(0.398) (0.681) (0.794) (0869) (0.706)
      
Employment -0.631 -0.331 -1.41 -0.275 -0.984
No District Fixed 
Effects
(0.115) (0.139) (0.491) (0.192) (0.315)
      
Employment -0.340 -0.145 0.226 0.117 -0.380
District Fixed 
Effects
(0.107) (0.132) (0.383) (0.156) (0.209)
      
IV Estimation      
      
Log Wage -1.52 -15.1 -0.297 -0.098 2.76
No District Fixed 
Effects
(2.13) (11.4) (6.20) (2.85) (2.80)
      
Log Wage 3.72 -12.3 12.2 3.51 5.99
District Fixed 
Effects
(1.81) (10.0) (6.53) (2.43) (3.23)
      
Employment -14.4 -0.267 -7.03 -1.31 -9.78
No District Fixed 
Effects
(2.28) (0.904) (2.32) (0.555) (6.35)
      
Employment -14.8 1.63 6.05 -0.318 -4.94
District Fixed 
Effects
(2.43) (1.33) (2.63) (0.379) (6.36)
      
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  The values in the cells are the estimated β from equation 1, the 
estimated effect of return migration on labor market outcomes. Each column represents using a different 
sample, while each row represents a different estimation equation.  The other regressors used in the model 
include years of schooling, age, age squared, quarterly dummies, yearly dummies, marriage dummy, 
dummies for sector of work (agriculture, construction, services, manufacturing), dummies for working in 
Israel and Jerusalem, dummies for living in a refugee camp and urban area, days or work per week, and  a 
dummy for living in Gaza. The instrumental variable models used out migration from the district four 
quarters prior as the instrument for current return migration.  
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